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NEURORHETORIC, RACE, AND THE LAW: TOXIC NEURAL 
PATHWAYS AND HEALING ALTERNATIVES 
LUCY JEWEL 
INTRODUCTION 
Persuasion happens in both the brain and the body.  Departing from a 
Cartesian view of rationality, neuroscience explains that the mind and the 
body are highly integrated.  It is a fallacy to believe that we engage with ar-
guments in an abstract, analytical, and unemotional fashion.  Instead, neu-
roscience explains that when rhetoric influences us, it does so in an embod-
ied way, triggering electrochemical reactions that traverse our neural 
pathways, beyond the purview of our conscious thought.  Although it 
sounds like a science fiction concept, the biological and embodied nature of 
rhetoric is in line with the beliefs of the ancient Sophists, who understood 
rhetoric to have the same kind of effect on the brain as a drug.  This ancient 
understanding, that rhetoric can infiltrate the human body, is another in-
stance where ancient knowledge aligns with modern scientific theory.1 
Neurorhetoric is the study of how rhetoric shapes the human brain.  At 
the forefront of science and communication studies, neurorhetoric challeng-
es many preconceptions about how humans respond to persuasive stimuli.  
Neurorhetoric can be applied to a multiplicity of relevant legal issues, in-
cluding the topic of this Symposium Issue: race and advocacy.  After detail-
ing the neuroscientific and cognitive theories that underlie neurorhetoric, 
this Essay theorizes ways in which neurorhetoric intersects with the law, 
advocacy, and race.  This Essay explores how toxic racial stereotypes and 
categories become embedded in the human brain and what can be done 
about it. 
This Essay, which examines the way that language creates thought pat-
terns that can become collectively entrenched, is especially relevant in our 
extremely divisive political age.  For instance, President Donald Trump’s 
campaign drew upon negative stereotypes about minorities by crafting an us 
                                                          
© 2017 Lucy Jewel. 
 Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. 
 1.  See Lucille A. Jewel, Old-School Rhetoric and New-School Cognitive Science: The En-
during Power of Logocentric Categories, 13 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC 39, 40–42 (2016) (posit-
ing that ancient wisdom concerning effective argumentation is supported by modern scientific un-
derstandings of human information processing). 
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vs. them dichotomy to foment political support.2  As discussed below, these 
either/or thought patterns, adopted collectively, are what fueled the totalitar-
ian and fascist regimes prior to World War II.  And it is not just right-wing 
western political rhetoric that threatens.  The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS) also employs highly effective rhetorical tactics of inclusion and ex-
clusion, defining a community of Muslims (the Ummah) who must join in 
jihad against the kufr camp, all those individuals existing outside the Um-
mah.  ISIS’s rhetoric, diffused online through multiple media platforms, ef-
fectively draws in disaffected youth from all over the world to join the 
movement, become part of the community, and massacre those outside of 
the community.3 
The harmful rhetoric used to describe racial minorities and other sub-
ordinated groups produces toxic thought patterns that can become en-
trenched in the public mind.  For instance, as this Essay explains in more 
detail below, when overt racism lost political credibility in the 1970s, con-
servative political operatives began using coded categories to link racial 
minorities with enduring negative stereotypes.  For example, the term 
“Welfare Queen” automatically conjures up racialized images that reify ex-
isting power structures in a rapid and unconscious way.  The term quickly 
captures complex ideas concerning the undeserving versus deserving poor, 
the racialized and feminized nature of poverty in the United States, and 
longstanding historical stereotypes about race, work, and family.4 
Neuroscience explains why and how racially coded categories are so 
efficient: they create neural pathways that, upon continued use, become col-
lectively entrenched.  An entrenched neural pathway offers a smooth and 
rapid path for a conclusory message to reach an individual’s consciousness.  
Coded categories are harmful because they encourage rapid unconscious 
thinking that has the effect of hardwiring stereotypes into the pathways of 
the brain.  The rapid way in which a term raises these unspoken conclusions 
makes it difficult to imagine other narrative possibilities or engage in rea-
soned deliberation about the issue. 
This Essay explores six thoughts related to neurorhetoric, the law, and 
race.  First, this Essay generally explains the cognitive science and neuro-
science theories that form the foundation of neurorhetoric, describing how 
                                                          
 2.  Ian Haney-López, This Is How Trump Convinces His Supporters They’re Not Racist, 
NATION (Aug. 2, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/this-is-how-trump-supporters-
convince-themselves-theyre-not-racist/ (identifying “Trump’s tales of racial doom” as “the four 
horsemen of Latino immigration, black crime, Islamic terrorism, and Chinese economic manipula-
tion”); see infra notes 82–83 and accompanying text. 
 3.  See Amaryllis Georges, ISIS Rhetoric for the Creation of the Ummah 4, 19–20 (TRENDS 
Research & Advisory Working Paper No. 6, 2015), http://trendsinstitution.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/ISIS-rhetoric-for-the-creation-of-the-Ummah1.pdf.  
 4.  See infra notes 19–26. 
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rhetoric enters and interacts with the human brain and body.  Second, from 
a historical perspective, this Essay explores how racialized rhetoric can be 
used to produce collective brain pathways that dehumanizes entire groups 
of people—a frightening process that sheds light on the widespread acqui-
escence to genocide and racial annihilation, such as what occurred in the 
Holocaust. 
The third point fleshes out the intersection between neurorhetoric and 
race in the United States, with a specific focus on how U.S. racial stereo-
types become embedded in the collective brainscape.  The fourth point ad-
dresses neurorhetoric and the law, detailing law’s unique power to reify 
concepts, which makes the law an especially potent type of embodied rheto-
ric.  Building upon the previous discussion, the fifth point provides three 
concrete examples of how neurorhetoric connects with the law and race—in 
the courtroom, in recent tragedies involving police shootings of black men, 
and in the term “alien,” a toxic legal category that castigates and dehuman-
izes immigrant groups. 
Finally, this Essay concludes with a theory of hope.  To the extent that 
rhetoric produces collective neural pathways that reinforce racial oppression 
and subordination, the identification and deployment of alternative dis-
courses have the potential to carve out healing pathways that can reshape 
brains, both individually and collectively.  To that end, this Essay proposes 
a novel approach to legal rhetoric: a comparative approach that might un-
cover alternative discourses that can be infused into the law, carving out 
healing brain pathways and devitalizing pernicious pathways. 
I.  DEVELOPING THE DISCIPLINE OF NEURORHETORIC 
A.  The Foundation: Conceptions of Rhetoric 
Neurorhetoric is a new discipline that applies neuroscience to under-
stand how rhetoric stimulates activity that can actually change the shape 
and form of the brain.  To set the foundation, it is useful to return to the 
original understanding of the term rhetoric.  Ancient Greek rhetoricians de-
fined rhetoric as the art of persuasion and/or a process for discovering truth 
by argumentation.5  This conception of rhetoric is fairly narrow, in contrast 
to the word’s original etymology.  Rhetoric derives from the Greek word 
“eirō,” or “I say.”  Rhetoric could mean “[a]lmost anything related to the 
act of saying something to someone . . . .”6  The point here is that rhetoric 
relates to language, conversation, words, and even images.  A broader con-
ception of rhetoric complements the ideas in this Essay, which addresses 
                                                          
 5.  RICHARD E. YOUNG ET AL., RHETORIC: DISCOVERY AND CHANGE 1 (1970). 
 6.  Id. 
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how words and phrases become cemented inside the brain in such a way as 
to influence thoughts and beliefs. 
As a matter of orientation, neurorhetoric sits within the discipline of 
modern rhetoric, the study of persuasion and communication in a variety of 
contexts—ancient narratives, poetry, literature, popular culture, film, televi-
sion, and the news media.  Modern rhetoric is also interdisciplinary, engag-
ing with social and scientific theories to understand how people are per-
suaded.  Legal rhetoric, described more fully below, studies persuasion in a 
legal advocacy setting.  This Essay draws upon both modern rhetoric stud-
ies and legal rhetoric disciplines. 
B.  The Mind: Cognitive Rhetoric and Cognitive Science 
Neurorhetoric descends from cognitive rhetoric, the application of 
cognitive science, or the study of “how people conceptualize the world[,]”7 
to rhetoric.  Cognitive rhetoric might be understood as the generalized study 
of how the human mind responds to persuasive stimuli.8  Cognitive rhetoric 
is often focused on two fundamental concepts—metaphors and categories.  
Metaphors and categories are devices that help humans streamline thoughts 
when confronted with complex information.9 
A metaphor allows the human mind to connect one concept to another 
in an automatic and embodied way.10  The metaphor of more correlating 
with up (positive) and less correlating with down (negative) exemplifies a 
concept that has become deeply connected to the mind, the body, and the 
physical environment.11  When we remark that things are “looking up” to 
express a positive outlook, we are expressing an embodied metaphor, with-
out realizing the connection between the positivity and the upwards direc-
tion.  Moreover, the directional shifts, up or down, reflect the physical way 
                                                          
 7.  GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK 3 (2d 
ed. 2002). 
 8.  For a general overview of cognitive rhetoric principles, see Jewel, supra note 1.  Cogni-
tive rhetoric also uncovers knowledge of how humans can be persuaded when information is pre-
sented in certain ways, such as introducing a request, subtly, up front, before asking the subject to 
act on the request.  See Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Science of Persuasion: An Initial Exploration, 
2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 411, 415 (citing DANIEL O’KEEFE, PERSUASION: THEORY AND 
RESEARCH 169 (1990)).  For a succinct exploration of cognitive rhetoric in the context of political 
discourse, see GEORGE LAKOFF, THE POLITICAL MIND: A COGNITIVE SCIENTIST’S GUIDE TO 
YOUR BRAIN AND ITS POLITICS (2009). 
 9.  See generally GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (2003 ed. 
1980); GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL 
ABOUT THE MIND (1987).  Lakoff refers to metaphors and categories, or even narratives, as cogni-
tive frames.  LAKOFF, supra note 8, at 22, 133. 
 10.  LAKOFF, supra note 7, at 4; STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, 
LIFE, AND MIND 65 (2001). 
 11.  See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 9, at 14–16; WINTER, supra note 10, at 31. 
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that the metaphor bridges connections between our minds and our physical 
bodies. 
Categories are often comprised of one or more associative metaphors.  
We “pick out parts of our experience and treat them as discrete entities or 
substances of a uniform kind.”12  For instance, when we categorize someone 
as motherly or maternal, we apply widely shared physical experiences to 
give a category a metaphorical meaning.  The understanding that a maternal 
person is a warm and caring person stems from early childhood experiences 
that have become deeply embodied.  As infants (for most but not all indi-
viduals), we associated our mother with warmth, food, and nurturance.  
This example illustrates how the connectedness of the two concepts—
motherhood with warmth and caring—arose from our bodily experiences.13 
Like metaphors, categories function unconsciously and rapidly.14  
Lakoff and Johnson explain: 
Understanding our experiences in terms of objects and substances 
allows us to pick out parts of our experience and treat them as 
discrete entities or substances of a uniform kind.  Once we can 
identify our experiences as entities or substances, we can refer to 
them, categorize them, group them, and quantify them—and, by 
this means, reason about them.15 
When we are confronted with a category, our mind quickly grasps the 
complexity of the concept.  We simplify complex information when the 
various parts of the concept come together in one unified whole.  Further, 
categories do not always reflect objective truths about the material world; 
rather, they may be based on subjective choices that reflect one’s culture or 
individual experience.16  Culture can produce unified categories that func-
tion as metaphorical “code” for more implicit concepts.17  For example, 
when we use the category “unwed mother” or “working mother,” our mind 
quickly latches onto the majoritarian cultural values associated with these 
categories.18  Both of these categories imply that the mother is less than ide-
al. 
Social stereotypes cognitively function as coded categories, collective-
ly understood to refer to negative generalizations about a social or racial 
                                                          
 12.  LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 9, at 25. 
 13.  GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND 
AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT 46–51 (1999).  
 14.  Id. at 13, 18; see also LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 9, at 25.  
 15.  LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 9, at 25. 
 16.  See LAKOFF, supra note 9, at 8 (“[H]uman categorization is essentially a matter of both 
human experience and imagination—of perception, motor activity, and culture on the one hand, 
and of metaphor, metonymy, and mental imagery on the other.”). 
 17.  See LAKOFF, supra note 8, at 83–84. 
 18.  LAKOFF, supra note 9, at 80, 82. 
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group.19  Social and racial stereotypes rely on metonymy, the concept that 
some or a few attributes of a category stand for the whole.20  In her master-
ful article, Deadbeat Dads & Welfare Queens: How Metaphor Shapes Pov-
erty Law, Professor Ann Cammett utilizes cognitive rhetoric to explain the 
“Welfare Queen” epithet, which conveyed a powerful, racially coded mes-
sage generating political disfavor for social welfare legislation in the 
1970s.21  The Welfare Queen trope developed out of a 1970s news story 
concerning an unmarried mother who fraudulently used aliases to obtain 
welfare benefits in the 1970s, abusing the benefits system to amass cash and 
wealth.22  Ronald Reagan repeatedly popularized the term in stump speech-
es, raising ire directed toward the Welfare Queen, her cash, and her Cadil-
lac.23  The fraudulent practices of one welfare recipient became, in 
metynomic fashion, the category that stood for all mothers on welfare.  The 
Welfare Queen term relied on the metaphorical category of mother, but de-
fined mother in the alterity, as an exemplar of a mother with loose morals 
and little virtue.24  The reference to other attributes of category member-
ship—the Cadillac for instance—functioned to cement an implicit and col-
lective understanding that mothers on welfare were primarily black, even 
though the majority of those on public assistance at the time were white.25  
With one shot over the bow, the Welfare Queen rhetoric generated a syn-
                                                          
 19.  Id. at 84–85; see also Ann Cammett, Deadbeat Dads & Welfare Queens: How Metaphor 
Shapes Poverty Law, 34 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 233 (2014). 
 20.  LAKOFF, supra note 9, at 20, 84–85. 
 21.  Cammett, supra note 19.  In the spring of 2016, Professor Cammett re-examined the Wel-
fare Queen trope in the context of recent efforts to criminalize black mothers.  See generally Ann 
Cammett, Welfare Queens Redux: Criminalizing Black Mothers in the Age of Neoliberalism, 25 S. 
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 363 (2016).  Professor Cammett’s latest piece on the Welfare Queen was 
part of an excellent symposium, organized by Professor Camille Gear Rich, where scholars exam-
ined the Welfare Queen construct through feminist and critical race theory lenses, with the goal of 
reframing the narrative.  The papers presented at this symposium are collected in an issue of the 
Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal.  See R.A. Lenhardt, Black Citizenship 
Through Marriage? Reflections on the Moynihan Report at Fifty, 25 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 347 
(2016); Kimani Paul-Emile, Reconsidering Criminal Background Checks: Race, Gender, and Re-
demption, 25 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 395 (2016); Lisa R. Pruitt, Welfare Queens and White 
Trash, 25 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 289 (2016); Camille Gear Rich, Reclaiming the Welfare Queen: 
Feminist and Critical Race Theory Alternatives to Existing Anti-Poverty Discourse, 25 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 257 (2016); Laurel Parker West, Soccer Moms, Welfare Queens, Waitress Moms, 
and Super Moms: Myths of Motherhood in State Media Coverage of Child Care During the “Wel-
fare Reforms” of the 1990s, 25 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 313 (2016). 
 22.  See Cammett, supra note 19, at 243–44; Josh Levin, The Welfare Queen, SLATE (Dec. 
19, 2013, 12:41 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/history/2013/12/linda_ 
taylor_welfare_queen_ronald_reagan_made_her_a_notorious_american_villain.html.  
 23.  See Levin, supra note 22 (“[I]n stump speech after stump speech, Reagan regaled his 
supporters with the story of an Illinois woman whose feats of deception were too amazing to be 
believed.”). 
 24.  See Cammett, supra note 19, at 237, 248. 
 25.  Id. at 236, 237, 244. 
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thesis of negative racial stereotypes about struggling mothers living in pov-
erty. 
In historical context, the Welfare Queen example illustrates the so-
called “Southern Strategy,” a new type of racially coded rhetoric deployed 
by conservative politicians after the civil rights movement when it became 
impolite to display overt racism.  In an infamous recorded interview, Lee 
Atwater, an architect of the Southern Strategy, explained that in lieu of us-
ing racial epithets to foment support (as had been the practice in the 1930s 
and 1940s), it was much more effective to utilize abstract categories like 
“forced busing, states’ rights, and all that stuff,” which functioned as code 
words indicating the superior interests of white citizens over those of black 
citizens.26 
C.  The Brain: Neuroscience 
Building upon cognitive rhetoric, neurorhetoric expands our under-
standing of how persuasion works, studying how informational stimuli in-
teract within the neural pathways of the brain.  Neuroscience explains that 
when we think, electrochemical reactions fire and are conducted from one 
place to another in our synapses, the connective spaces between two neuron 
cells in our brain.27  This activity occurs through neural circuits or net-
works.28  Whereas cognitive rhetoric might be conceived as the study of 
how persuasion works in the mind, neurorhetoric looks at how persuasion 
works in a biological sense, in the brain.29 
Thus, neurorhetoric seeks to connect neuroscientific understandings of 
cognition and thought to rhetoric, adding another layer of understanding for 
                                                          
 26.  Rick Perlstein, Exclusive: Lee Atwater’s Infamous 1981 Interview on the Southern Strat-
egy, NATION (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/exclusive-lee-atwaters-infamous-
1981-interview-southern-strategy/ (italicized in original). 
 27.  JOSEPH LEDOUX, SYNAPTIC SELF: HOW OUR BRAINS BECOME WHO WE ARE 44 (2002).  
The cells in our brains, called neurons, have special appendages—axons that function as output 
channels and dendrites that function as input channels—that connect in the synapse.  Id. at 40–41.  
 28.  Id. at 49. 
 29.  Neurorhetoric is a new discipline.  Brett Ingram, an assistant professor of rhetoric at Bos-
ton College, has written a masterful doctoral dissertation that introduces the subject.  Brett Ingram, 
Critical Rhetoric in the Age of Neuroscience (Feb. 2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univer-
sity of Massachusetts Amherst), http://scholarworks.umass.edu/open_access_dissertations/690/ 
?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=critical-rhetoric-in-the-age-of-neuroscience.  
George Lakoff’s work, insofar that it addresses how neural synapses respond to discourse, could 
also be categorized as neurorhetoric.  See, e.g., LAKOFF, supra note 8, at 24–26, 83–85.  In addi-
tion to Ingram and Lakoff, Jeff Pruchnic, who teaches rhetoric at Wayne State University, writes 
on the topic.  See Jeff Pruchnic, Neurorhetorics: Cybernetics, Psychotropics, and the Materiality 
of Persuasion, 16 CONFIGURATIONS 167 (2009).  William Connolly and Pasi Väliaho would also 
qualify as scholars of neurorhetoric.  See WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, NEUROPOLITICS: THINKING, 
CULTURE, SPEED (2002); PASI VÄLIAHO, BIOPOLITICAL SCREENS: IMAGE, POWER, AND THE 
NEOLIBERAL BRAIN (2014). 
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how meaning is created in the brain.  Central to neurorhetoric are the con-
cepts of neuroplasticity, mapping, and canalization/attenuation.  Neu-
rorhetoric’s biggest takeaway is the idea that discursive stimuli (such as 
words or categories) can actually impact the structure of the brain, individu-
ally and on a mass scale. 
Neuroplasticity is the concept that the structure of one’s brain can be 
altered by one’s experience.  When we think a certain thought or perform a 
physical action, our brain’s neuron cells fire in different areas, coming to-
gether to complete the task.  As we repeat a mental operation, these neurons 
continue to fire in different areas and eventually become fused together in a 
network or circuit.30  “Cells that fire together wire together” is a pithy quote 
that captures the idea of various neural electrical pathways forging together 
in a single circuit based on repeated triggering.31 
This process of welding different neural paths into one connected path 
is also known as mapping.32  For an example, let us return to the discussion 
of the mother metaphor, discussed above.  When parts of a baby’s brain 
dealing with appetite, physical temperature, and affection are triggered in 
the presence of the mother, a network of connected neural pathways fuse 
together, linking concepts of warmth and sustenance with the concept of the 
child’s mother.33  As the infant is repeatedly exposed to the mother who 
feeds and provides comfort, these previously separate neural networks be-
come more connected and entrenched.  Eventually, the biological associa-
tion of “mother” with warmth, nurturance, and caring gives rise to an ab-
stract metaphor, seen in concepts like “he’s a warm person,” or “she’s a 
block of ice.”34 
The deepening of neural pathways in response to repeated exposure to 
a stimulus can be understood as a process of canalization occurring in the 
plastic brain.  Our brains become “perpetually altered” by every encounter 
and every interaction.35  Canalization of neural paths has been analogized to 
what happens when sledding on a snowy hill.  The first time one sleds down 
a hill, new tracks are made.  In subsequent trips down the slope, more likely 
                                                          
 30.  LEDOUX, supra note 27, at 79.   
 31.  Id.  This quote originated in the 1990s as scientists described neural network connection 
theory, a topic first developed by Canadian psychologist Donald Hebb.  See Carla J. Shatz, The 
Developing Brain, 267 SCI. AM. 60, 64 (1992) (“In a sense, then, cells that fire together wire to-
gether.”); Siegrid Löwel & Wolf Singer, Selection of Intrinsic Horizontal Connections in the Vis-
ual Cortex by Correlated Neuronal Activity, 255 SCIENCE 209, 211 (1992) (“[N]eurons wire to-
gether if they fire together.”); see also D. O. HEBB, THE ORGANIZATION OF BEHAVIOR: A 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY (5th prtg. 1959).  
 32.  WINTER, supra note 10, at 30–31; see also LAKOFF, supra note 8, at 84–85. 
 33.  LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 46–55. 
 34.  LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 9, at 256. 
 35.  NORMAN DOIDGE, THE BRAIN THAT CHANGES ITSELF: STORIES OF PERSONAL TRIUMPH 
FROM THE FRONTIERS OF BRAIN SCIENCE 209 (2007). 
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than not, one selects a path that has already been forged.  The more sledding 
that occurs, the deeper the existing tracks become.36  Once we have created 
these tracks in the brain, they become “‘really speedy’ and very efficient at 
guiding the sled down the hill.”37  Once a thought becomes cemented in the 
brain, that thought appears with great rapidity and arises unconsciously.38 
Once a concept has been synaptically cemented by continued activa-
tion of the same neural pathways by the same stimulus, it becomes highly 
difficult to undo.39  Through a process of attenuation, alternative pathways 
in the brain can become cut off.40  This happens because the development of 
neural pathways is “a competitive process, one in which the connections 
that are used are kept and those that go unused are eliminated.”41  Thus, 
“[o]nce a particular plastic change occurs in the brain and becomes well es-
tablished, it can prevent other changes from occurring.”42 
Canalization and attenuation explain how ideas get stuck in our brains.  
When mental concepts become canalized, they become deep-seated habits 
of thought, which then cut off competing thought patterns.43  The more a 
neural pathway becomes entrenched in the brain, the more certainty we 
have with respect to the associated thought.44  And these ideas can be good 
or bad.  We have all heard the term “toxic brain loop.”  In neuroscience par-
lance, that concept refers to an entrenched neural pathway that has cut off 
more positive thought patterns.  But there is also the possibility that healthy 
thought patterns can become canalized, which would implant positive 
pathways in the brain but weaken more negative patterns.  
II.  GETTING HIGH: RHETORIC INSIDE OUR BRAINS AND BODIES 
As a stimulus that triggers thought, rhetoric can change the brain’s 
structure, both individually and collectively.45  When we are asked to con-
sider a thought pattern over and over again (a common rhetorical strategy), 
we are left with a mark in our brains.46  Contrary to the deeply held Western 
                                                          
 36.  Id.  
 37.  Id.  
 38.  Id.; WINTER, supra note 10, at 32; see also LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 9, at 256–57 
(explaining how entrenched metaphors “arise spontaneously and automatically without our being 
aware of them”). 
 39.  WINTER, supra note 10, at 32.  
 40.  Ingram, supra note 29, at 10–11. 
 41.  LEDOUX, supra note 27, at 76. 
 42.  DOIDGE, supra note 35, at xx.  
 43.  Id. at 209. 
 44.  Ingram, supra note 29, at 10–11. 
 45.  See DOIDGE, supra note 35, at 213 (“Each thought alters the physical state of your brain 
synapses at a microscopic level.”). 
 46.  Ingram, supra note 29, at 60. 
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belief that there is a separation between the mind and the body, rhetoric can 
get inside our brains and bodies and make us think and feel things without 
the intervention of conscious rationality.  In a nutshell, neurorhetoric chal-
lenges traditional conceptions of reason and choice.47 
The embodied nature of thought helps explain how deeply rhetoric in-
fluences us.  Thought is embodied; our thoughts are deeply interconnected 
to our physical bodies.48  For instance, when we read something that asks us 
to imagine a scene or when we view a film, we use the same neural struc-
ture of our brain that we use when living out that scene.49  As George 
Lakoff and Mark Johnson describe, “When we imagine seeing a scene, our 
visual cortex is active.  When we imagine moving our bodies, the pre-motor 
cortex and motor cortex are active.”50 
The concept of having a “gut feeling” about a particular outcome re-
flects the embodied nature of thought.  Neuroscientist Antonio Damasio de-
vised the term “somatic marker” to highlight this relationship—soma com-
ing from the Greek word for body and marker reflecting the impact that 
previous thought experiences have had on our brains.51  Somatic markers 
represent canalized thought patterns that guide the direction, rapidly and 
unconsciously, of our thought processes.  Rather than functioning as a form 
of “high reason,” somatic markers highlight some options, rapidly eliminat-
ing the negative and favoring the positive.52  They operate at a preconscious 
and unconscious level.53  Somatic markers “do not deliberate for us[;]” ra-
ther, they function as a “biasing device.”54 
Somatic markers are generated when we engage with a certain thought 
over and over again.  The common rhetorical strategy of repetition seems 
designed to help entrench a thought or conclusion in the brain.  Moreover, 
collective cultural experiences can produce somatic markers.55  Political 
scientist William Connolly has applied Damasio’s somatic marker thesis 
and argued that with respect to culture, the rhetoric we are exposed to in 
television, film, and journalism can produce somatic markers that affect our 
thinking and judgment in an unconscious way.56  Through mass culture, 
                                                          
 47.  For an explanation of traditional conceptions of reasoning, see ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, 
DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN 171 (1994). 
 48.  See LAKOFF, supra note 8, at 40; LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 9, at 257. 
 49.  See DOIDGE, supra note 35, at 204 (“[I]n action and imagination many of the same parts 
of the brain are activated.”); LAKOFF, supra note 8, at 40. 
 50.  LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 9, at 257. 
 51.  DAMASIO, supra note 47, at 173–75. 
 52.  Id. at 174.  
 53.  Id. at 173–74. 
 54.  Id. at 174. 
 55.  See generally CONNOLLY, supra note 29, at 34–37.  
 56.  Id. at 35–36. 
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somatic markers become carved out in our brains as early as childhood, be-
coming “filtered into [our] mode of being” before we even develop lan-
guage skills.57 
Further, rhetoric’s emotional aspects tend to deemphasize our critical 
thinking faculties.  When we are presented with a stimulus that promotes 
emotion, it becomes difficult to think with our higher order faculties.  In-
stead, our circuits become focused on the threatening situation and the 
flight or fight response.58  Emotional rhetoric releases chemical reactions in 
our brain that subdue and dampen the part of our brain (the prefrontal cor-
tex) that controls higher order thinking.59  The end result is a state of mind-
lessness, which is analogous to a drug-induced state.60  Emotional rhetoric 
is also more memorable and powerful than non-emotional rhetoric, because 
emotional rhetoric activates more systems in the brain, the arousal is great-
er, and larger neural networks become forged.61  In other words, we engage 
more deeply with emotional rhetoric and it feels great. 
Rhetoric-induced mindlessness often happens in a collective ritualistic 
setting, such as when we attend a rally for our preferred political candidate 
or a sports game for our favorite professional or college team.62  In this situ-
ation, our brain dampens our critical thinking and ratchets up its emotional 
side.63  These situations  
all involve a sublimation of individuality caused by the dampen-
ing of general neuronal communication, coupled with the intensi-
fication of the activity of a few specific neural networks.  The 
flood of neurotransmitters that produces pleasure puts brain cells 
on alert, making them more receptive to signals from other neu-
rons.  Consequently, our receptivity to sensual interactions with 
the environment and other people is increased, but our cognitive 
capacity is reduced.64 
In this way, rhetoric fosters communal bonds by fueling intragroup intima-
cy in a pleasurable way.65 
A study from Emory neuroscientist Drew Westen further supports the 
rhetoric/drug analogy.  In this brain imaging study, subjects viewed a fa-
vored political candidate making a clearly inconsistent statement.  During 
                                                          
 57.  Id. at 47. 
 58.  LEDOUX, supra note 27, at 217. 
 59.  Ingram, supra note 29, at 65. 
 60.  Id. at 50, 65, 69. 
 61.  Id. at 65 (quoting LEDOUX, supra note 27, at 322). 
 62.  Id. at 64. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. at 63. 
 65.  Id. 
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this scenario, areas of the subjects’ brains related to unpleasant distress lit 
up.66  The subjects then attempted to rehabilitate their candidate by applying 
faulty and illogical reasoning to rationalize the inconsistency; their brains 
were looking for “ways to turn off [this] spigot of unpleasant emotion.”67  
When the subjects engaged in this flawed reasoning, the brain scans indi-
cated that the subjects were able to turn off the neural areas associated with 
unpleasantness and instead trigger areas of pleasure.68  The faulty and illog-
ical reasoning triggered a state of pleasure in the brain, “activating reward 
circuits that [gave] partisans a jolt of positive reinforcement for their biased 
reasoning.”69  The illogical reasoning provided a neural “fix” similar to 
what drug addicts experience.70 
Viewed through the lens of neuroscience, rhetoric is like a drug—it 
functions beyond consciousness, heightens emotional reactions, and can 
produce a state of mindlessness.  The Greek Sophist Gorgias believed that 
“persuasive discourse has effects on the human soul that, like drugs or 
physical force, overwhelm and cancel out the possibility of individual agen-
cy.”71  Thus, the Greeks categorized the rhetorician in the same class as a 
medical doctor or mystic.72  Ancient Greek sages feared the embodied pow-
er of rhetoric, and, as a precursor to Descartes, exhorted individuals to try to 
separate the mind from the body, so as to not succumb to rhetoric’s power-
ful spell.73  Here, the ancient idea that rhetoric intrudes into and interacts 
with the body aligns with modern neuroscientific and cognitive theories that 
support an embodied approach to rhetoric. 
III.  THE DARK SIDE OF NEURORHETORIC—TOXIC NEURAL PATHWAYS 
The collective canalization produced by toxic rhetoric can lead to col-
lective oppression, even violence.  Negative stereotypes can become collec-
tively embedded with unspeakable consequences, helping us to understand, 
for instance, how regular German citizens collectively acquiesced to the 
Holocaust or why ISIS’s online messaging is so magnetic.  Repeated expo-
sure to certain forms of narrative rhetoric causes the neural synapse circuits 
associated with these stories to become so strong that they form a perma-
                                                          
 66.  DREW WESTEN, THE POLITICAL BRAIN: THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN DECIDING THE FATE 
OF THE NATION xi (2007).   
 67.  Id. at xiii. 
 68.  Id. at xiv. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Ingram, supra note 29, at 4. 
 72.  Id. at 5. 
 73.  Id. at 6. 
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nent part of the brain’s structure.74  In this way, deep narratives become im-
planted. 
In studying the connection between rhetoric and violence in Nazi 
Germany, rhetoric professor Jeffrey Murray theorizes that the collective ac-
ceptance of Hitler’s Final Solution was dependent on the repeated use of 
discourses in three forms: (1) anti-Semitic narratives in speeches, newspa-
pers, and other media, (2) anti-Semitic laws, and, eventually, (3) enacted 
violence, the public performance of violent acts of physical aggression 
against Jewish Germans, such as the anti-Jewish pogrom carried out in 
1938, known as Kristallnacht.75  The anti-Semitic narratives linked the con-
cept of a Jewish person with fear and disgust.76  Jewish people were con-
sistently and repeatedly “described as the murderers of everything the Ger-
man masses identified as good, true, and beautiful.”77  A severe dichotomy 
developed in Nazi rhetoric, with Jewish persons construed as the enemy, 
inhuman, and incapable of being rehabilitated.  The Jewish villain was then 
contraposed with the good and heroic people of Teutonic/Nordic descent.78  
The Final Solution was so successful because its victims were so effectively 
dehumanized; killing was not murder but rather a public policy decision. 
These hyperbolic narratives, dependent on vile stereotypes, were re-
peated over and over again, in journals, films, and in Hitler’s dramatic 
speeches.79  Hitler himself seemed to understand the canalization process, 
because he knew that persuasion required the speaker to repeat the argu-
ment over and over again.80  Rhetoric’s ability to thrust people toward a ne-
farious state of mindlessness underscores Kenneth Burke’s conclusion that 
Hitler functioned as a potent medicine man with the ability to foment sup-
port for war and mass extermination of an entire people.81 
                                                          
 74.  See CONNOLLY, supra note 29, at 17, 35.  Here, Connolly suggest that mass media such 
as television and film, in so far as they combine the visual with sound and emotion, invoke em-
bodied cognitive traces that function on both a collective and individual level.  When we apply 
neuroplasticity theory to Connolly’s observations on mass media, we can infer that repeated expo-
sure to these stimuli will cause these cognitive traces to become further embedded and integrated 
in the mind’s structure.  See Doidge, supra note 35, at 213 (“Each thought alters the physical state 
of your brain synapses at a microscopic level.”).  
 75.  Jeffrey W. Murray, Constructing the Ordinary: The Dialectical Development of Nazi 
Ideology, 46 COMM. Q. 41, 42 (1998). 
 76.  See id. at 46–47.  For example, a repeated disgust narrative about Jewish People was that 
they drink the blood of Christian children. 
 77.  Michael Blain, Fighting Words: What We Can Learn from Hitler’s Hyperbole, 11 
SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 257, 258 (1988). 
 78.  Id. at 263–64. 
 79.  Murray, supra note 75, at 45–47. 
 80.  Blain, supra note 77, at 262.  
 81.  Id. at 257 (citing KENNETH BURKE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LITERARY FORM 191 (1941)). 
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Viewed from a neuroscience perspective, Nazi rhetoric successfully 
carved out deep neural pathways that became collectively entrenched.  In 
the collective mind, alternative narratives portraying Jewish people as fel-
low humans withered away from lack of use.  Emotional circuitry became 
activated, in a rapid and unconscious way, in the brains of German citizens 
attending rallies or viewing mass media, as they felt a sense of commonality 
in the face of threat.  The rhetoric also engendered collective mindlessness, 
entirely anesthetizing the German citizenry to the reality of human death 
and suffering happening in their midst.  Contemporary neuroscience re-
search tells us that this rhetorically induced mindlessness not only damp-
ened critical thought, but also, in all likelihood, triggered feelings of pleas-
ure. 
Moving to the contemporary U.S. political landscape, one sees disturb-
ing parallels in President Trump’s campaign rhetoric that vilified immi-
grants and Muslims, pitching them as a threat posed to traditional “Ameri-
can” citizens.82  While the consensus seems to be that President Trump is 
not a fascist in the same political form as it existed in Germany and Italy 
before World War II, he takes many items from the fascist recipe book.83  In 
a very frightening way, the dichotomous us vs. them rhetoric, which frames 
the other as inhuman, mirrors the strategies successfully deployed by Hitler 
and his peers to generate support for state-sanctioned mass murder.  Presi-
dent Trump’s rhetoric becomes more ominous than boorish when viewed 
through the lenses of history and neuroscience, which explain how rhetoric 
can induce a sense of mindlessness in the public and then cause them to buy 
into murderous solutions. 
Although President Trump is an easy target, the dark side of neu-
rorhetoric is not a right wing versus left wing issue.  Enabled by Internet 
technology, ISIS offers the most terrifying contemporary example of rheto-
ric’s murderous power.  Using the Internet and various social media net-
works, ISIS has dispersed its repetitive, dichotomous, and violent us vs. 
                                                          
 82.  For instance, recently many media outlets have analyzed whether or not Donald Trump is 
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 83.  See Chotiner, supra note 82 (reporting on a conversation with Columbia University polit-
ical history professor Robert Paxton, a scholar of the history of fascism). 
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them messaging across nations, composing intense “communities” of mur-
der-minded jihadists situated in all parts of the world.84  Although the rhe-
torical approach is the same, the process of galvanizing mass support for 
murder has changed; technology has enabled ISIS to corral support for its 
terror network outside of a traditional nation state and without the assis-
tance of a single charismatic speaker sermonizing in brick-and-mortar sta-
diums. 
A.  Neurorhetoric and Race—The Welfare Queen Example 
In turning to the subject of this Symposium Issue, neuroscience helps 
us understand how coded racial categories can become ingrained in the col-
lective mindset.  As mentioned above, Professor Cammett masterfully ex-
plained how the coded category “Welfare Queen” became part of the U.S. 
cultural landscape by virtue of its potency as a metonymic metaphor in 
which the story of one person became associated with an entire group of 
persons (impoverished black mothers).85  In a more specific sense, a neu-
rorhetoric perspective helps us understand how the metaphor became im-
printed in the brains of so many.  The metaphor relied on a complex set of 
dichotomous metaphors having to do with good mothers (nurturant, respon-
sible) and bad mothers (immoral, irresponsible), emphasizing the bad in 
contrast with the good.  The metaphor operated on an explicit gender axis—
Welfare Queen, as “queen” is explicitly gendered—and an implicit racial 
axis, as it was understood that she is black. 
This implicit racial understanding likely triggered implicit biases that 
have infected almost all of U.S. culture.86  Implicit biases are discriminatory 
beliefs, based on negative stereotypes and cultural generalization, which are 
held unconsciously.87  Moreover, implicit bias can cause persons to act in 
ways that diverge from their conscious or avowed belief systems.88  Re-
search on implicit bias indicates that unconscious or subconscious attitudes 
that favor whites over blacks lurks underneath the surface of our conscious-
ness.89  For instance, one study found that when whites viewed photographs 
of black people, their amygdala (the part of the brain responsible for pro-
cessing fear) was activated in a greater proportion to blacks viewing the 
same photographs, even though consciously, the white study subjects regis-
                                                          
 84.  See Georges, supra note 3. 
 85.  See supra notes 19–25 and accompanying text. 
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tered no fear.90  Thus, a racially coded category like Welfare Queen likely 
activated negative responses in target audiences, but below the level of con-
sciousness. 
Moreover, certain elements of the Welfare Queen narrative raised vis-
ual specters in the brain—such as the Welfare Queen’s Cadillac and her 
other luxury accoutrements—rendering the metaphor highly memorable.  
Visual information becomes more memorable because it is vivid, “(a) emo-
tionally interesting, (b) concrete and imagery-provoking, and (c) proximate 
in a sensory, temporal, or spatial way.”91  When we visualize imagery with 
our imagination, as rhetoric often asks us to do, we use the same part of our 
brain (the visual cortex) as we would if we were seeing the object 
firsthand.92 
With reliance on the implicit dichotomies of good mothers versus bad 
mothers and hardworking citizens versus freeloaders, the Welfare Queen 
metaphor likely generated an emotional response in audiences.  The emo-
tionality of the metaphor dampened the audience’s critical thinking facul-
ties93 but also rendered it more memorable.94  Because it relied on us vs. 
them social stereotypes, the metaphor also likely fostered feelings of in-
tragroup cohesion in the face of the “other.”  The combination of emotion-
ality with communal feelings likely generated a sense of mindlessness in 
the receiving audiences, a mindlessness that generated pleasure, despite the 
fact that the metaphor greatly departed from logocentric reasoning and fact-
based reality.95 
Thus, in collective neural pathways, the Welfare Queen triggered con-
comitant firings in various neural pathways related to concepts as disparate 
as women, good and bad mothers, the implicit bias against African Ameri-
cans, visualized luxury automobiles, and moral verdicts.  The consistent re-
iteration of the rhetoric, by politicians96 and journalists,97 welded a deeply 
entrenched neural network ensconced in the brains of the many individuals 
exposed to it.  The emotion and pleasure triggered by the code word gener-
ated even more potency for the neural pathway.  Alternative pathways that 
                                                          
 90.  See Phelps et al., supra note 86, at 732. 
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might have framed welfare as a helpful safety net necessary to protect the 
most vulnerable of American citizens, especially children, became attenuat-
ed from lack of use.  As it became part of the collective brain structure, 
however, the Welfare Queen metaphor helped persuade a large swath of 
Americans to view welfare as a racialized locus of fraud and immorality.  
For the most part, the advocacy occurred underneath the surface, operating 
unconsciously and rapidly in the brain, outside of logocentric cognition. 
B.  Neurorhetoric and the Law 
Applied to law, neurorhetoric has the potential to generate fascinating 
new theoretical and research inquiries.  In order to support future projects 
considering neurorhetoric and the law, three premises should be brought to 
the surface.  First, we have to understand that legal rhetoric situates the law 
as rhetoric.  In a common law system, the law is comprised of language—
the language of judicial opinions; the words of legal actors in the system 
(lawyers, lawmakers); the language of statutes, orders, and other sources of 
law; and even the language of contractual agreements, which produce pri-
vate legal worlds.  Legal rhetoric could have both a narrow or broad defini-
tion.  In its narrowest conception, legal rhetoric might be construed as the 
art of legal argumentation.  But, for purposes of this Essay, which seeks to 
outline an approach for comparative legal rhetoric, a broader definition is 
more appropriate.98 
A broad conception of legal rhetoric “looks at how the law works by 
exploring a meaning-making process, one in which the law is ‘constituted’ 
as human beings located within particular historical and cultural communi-
ties write, read, argue about, and decide legal issues.”99  In theorizing a def-
inition for legal rhetoric, Linda Berger was influenced by James Boyd 
White’s empowering conception of law.100  White’s conception of rhetoric 
flows from his liberating, anti-formalist view of what law is.  For White, 
[L]aw is a [sic] not an abstract system or scheme of rules, as we 
often speak of it, but an inherently unstable structure of thought 
and expression.  It is built upon a distinct set of dynamic and dia-
logic tensions, which include: tensions between ordinary lan-
guage and legal language; between legal language and the spe-
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cialized discourses of other fields; between language itself and 
the mute world that lies beneath it; between opposing lawyers; 
between conflicting but justifiable ways of giving meaning to the 
rules and principles of law; between substantive and procedural 
lines of thought; between law and justice; between the past, the 
present, and the future.101 
White’s conception of law is liberating because it gives legal actors 
agency over the process of making legal meanings.  The law is not just a 
static system of rules to be studied; rather, students and practitioners engage 
in a dynamic intellectual enterprise of remixing and reconstituting prece-
dential legal texts, with the goal of forging new and transformative legal 
meanings.102 
The law as rhetoric concept flows into a second premise, which is the 
law’s unique ability to reify norms by clothing them with the concrete pow-
er of the state, which in turn produces a collective reality.103  We saw an ex-
ample of this above, as one rhetoric scholar theorized that the German peo-
ple adopted Nazism’s Final Solution en masse in part because the rhetoric 
was codified in formal German laws that sanctioned the anti-Jewish boycott 
of 1933 and the Nuremberg Laws of 1935.104  This point has been most lu-
cidly expressed by French sociologist/anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu, a 
proponent of speech act theory, which encapsulates the idea that, in some 
circumstances, speech can influence/remake social reality.105  For Bourdieu, 
because of its compelling symbolic power—a power that people buy into 
and acquiesce in, law carries the unique power to create the social world, 
social groups in particular.106  There are some limits to law’s power to con-
struct reality, however, the law’s power only goes so far as it is able to mir-
ror and represent what people believe, understand, or are willing to believe 
and understand.107  As a result, the law usually functions as a kind of con-
firmation agent, ratifying and sanctifying majoritarian views of how the so-
cial world should be categorized.108  Nonetheless, for purposes of this Es-
say, legal rhetoric is an available vehicle for transforming the world and for 
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possibly healing the world, but only if there is collective buy-in.  And, col-
lective buy-in occurs from matching the rhetoric to compelling narratives, 
metaphors, and other ways of understanding the world.109 
The third relevant premise helps explain the unique power of law to 
shape collective reality from a neuroscience perspective.  In law, it is neces-
sary to repeat the same thought patterns (represented by rules, statutes, and 
other language forms).  While all legal systems require some recitation of 
the governing legal texts, the American common law system, with its em-
phasis on stare decisis and precedent, is particularly iterative and recursive, 
and requires a ritualistic recitation of rules, case precedents, even boiler-
plate language.  These iterative and recursive elements of the American 
common law system make the law a uniquely effective agent for cementing 
neural pathways.  Neuroscientific theory tells us that the more a particular 
thought pattern is repeated, the deeper it gets into our brains.  Thus, the re-
peated use of specific language forms creates collective neural pathways 
that become collectively entrenched.  The dark side of the law’s function as 
a mechanism for blazing collective neural pathways is that if laws consist-
ently produce negative outcomes, then bad law becomes part of our collec-
tive brain structure. 
C.  Neurorhetoric, Race, and the Law 
This part of the Essay identifies a few examples of where the law 
might be functioning to carve out or deepen neural paths that, when trig-
gered, reinforce toxic racial stereotypes.  The next Sections provide three 
brief examples that trace the connections between neurorhetoric, race, and 
the law: (1) in the courtroom; (2) the toxic legal category of “alien”; and (3) 
police violence and the right to bear arms. 
1.  Race & Neurorhetoric in Courtroom Settings 
An understanding of neurorhetoric is relevant for all types of legal ad-
vocacy.  Advocates should recognize that the use of certain tropes and im-
ages may be triggering deeply ingrained neural networks, requiring much 
effort to redirect the flow of energy in the brain.  For instance, emphasizing 
that a black mother receives public assistance might trigger all of the differ-
ent pathways that rapidly give rise to the embodied, negative reaction that 
the term Welfare Queen generated. 
In any criminal proceeding, a simple reference that a legal actor is a 
black male with a firearm is likely to trigger deep-seated neural pathways 
related to fear.  As set forth above, pathways in the amygdala are triggered 
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just upon viewing a photograph of a black face.110  Moreover, longstanding 
cultural narratives that frame black men as fearsome have dug deep trench-
es in our collective brain structures.111  Black men, in particular, have been 
constructed as metaphorical bogeymen, dark monsters who attack during 
the night.112  Stereotypes of black men “perpetuate black danger, which is 
always in the dark.”113 
Thus, in a legal proceeding, if a lawyer sees her/his opponent using 
language that triggers potentially toxic neural pathways, the response must 
be to reframe and reiterate facts in a way that will trigger alternative path-
ways.  To cut off the negative racialized stereotypes associated with a client 
receiving public assistance benefits, advocates might emphasize factual de-
tails that frame the client as nurturing and caring.  George Lakoff lucidly 
explains that the animosity toward government social safety net programs 
derives from collectively held neural networks triggered by a discourse that 
utilizes a “strict father” metaphor.114  An example of such a discourse is the 
argument that recipients of welfare are in need of discipline, should not be 
coddled, and should not be allowed to enter into a culture of dependency.  
The metaphor is so powerful because it connects with longstanding child-
hood bodily experiences of being raised by a strict parent (usually the fa-
ther).  In order to turn off that neural network, Lakoff suggests that advo-
cates trigger the neural network associated with a nurturant model of 
parenting, emphasizing the language of caring, warmth, and support for the 
vulnerable.115  Language that draws upon the nurturant mother creates a 
powerful form of neurorhetoric, because, like the strict father metaphor, it 
triggers neural pathways originating in body-brain connections forged long 
ago between the infant and the mother.116  The goal is to locate rhetoric that 
will trigger an equally strong neural network. 
2.  Race, Neurorhetoric, and the Term “Alien” 
This Essay’s second example raises issues of how legal language 
might contribute to toxic neural pathways. In our iterative common law sys-
tem, an often-repeated term can canalize negative stereotypes. The legal 
term “alien,” currently in use to categorize immigrants seeking legal status 
in the United States, illustrates how categorical language within U.S. legal 
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infrastructure contributes to toxic neural pathways that dehumanize.  The 
dictionary meaning of the noun form of alien includes four meanings: 
1.  An unnaturalized foreign resident of a country[;] 
2.  A member of another family, people, religion, or country[;] 
3.  An outsider[;] 
4.  A creature from outer space.117 
The adjective form includes five additional meanings: 
5.  Owing political allegiance to another country or government; 
foreign[;] 
6.  Belonging to, characteristic of, or derived from another coun-
try, place, society, or person; strange[;] 
7.  Being inconsistent or opposed; repugnant.118 
The first meaning of the term, as a noun and adjective, seems to be 
fairly neutral with little to no negative connotation.  However, the other 
connotations of the word imply a negative value judgment.  Aliens are “in-
consistent,” “repugnant,” and “strange.”  For individuals emigrating to the 
United States from Mexico, alien has long been rhetorically paired with 
conceptions of criminality and non-humanness.119  Beginning in the 1930s, 
the word alien has been commonly paired with the word illegal and used 
together with visual language depicting Mexicans as threatening, unsani-
tary, immoral, and criminal.120  Mexican immigrants were represented as a 
threatening horde that had to be contained.121  As another example of the 
synergistic relationship between law and collective cultural narratives, ille-
gal alien rhetoric materialized in newspapers and media concurrent with 
emerging federal laws that made it a felony to enter the United States from 
Mexico without authorization.122 
In current law practice, the term alien continues to be used in legal 
proceedings, in pleadings before Immigration Judges, the Board of Immi-
gration Court of Appeals, and other legal fora.  A search for the term “al-
ien” in Westlaw’s immigration database produces 9,998 cases using the 
term.  Title 8 of the United States Code is entitled “Aliens and Nationality” 
and the term repeatedly appears in various statutory sections.123  Westlaw 
Key Number 24 is entitled “Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship” and the 
term appears another nine times in the Key Number’s sub-categories.  The 
                                                          
 117.  Alien, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1985). 
 118.  Id. (italics in original).  
 119.  See Lisa A. Flores, Constructing Rhetorical Borders: Peons, Illegal Aliens, and Compet-
ing Narratives of Immigration, 20 CRITICAL STUD. MEDIA COMM. 362, 363, 372–81 (2003). 
 120.  See id. at 372–79. 
 121.  See id. at 375–76. 
 122.  See id. at 372–78. 
 123.  See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1555, 1557 (2012). 
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appearance of the term in case opinions, statutes, and the data structure of 
the law illustrates how imbricated the term is.  Lawyers cannot avoid the 
term if their advocacy requires them to quote language from a case, cite to 
the title of a statute, or use the Westlaw Key Number system to perform le-
gal research.  Performing these lawyering tasks deepens the collective neu-
ral pathways that flow toward fear and exclusion, igniting a collective brain 
loop that becomes difficult to halt. 
Neurorhetoric tells us that alien is not simply a “politically incorrect” 
term that has gone out of fashion.  A freighted word that is frequently reit-
erated, the term likely triggers neural networks connected to deep-seated 
fears of unknown persons, crime, and more generalized fears of the “other.”  
As a descriptor for people existing outside the bounds of what is familiar 
and safe, the term removes the humanity from an entire population of peo-
ple because “they” are not like “us.”124  In this way, the term rapidly and 
unconsciously generates collective support for policies of removal, deten-
tion, and deportation of Mexican immigrants.125  Objections to the contin-
ued use of terms like alien are not grounded in nanny-state word politics; 
rather, they reflect efforts to change cultural narratives, to attenuate toxic 
pathways in the brain that have been identified.  Although there are difficult 
practical considerations (as lawyers, we often must use the terms preferred 
by our audience), lawyers should nonetheless think twice before using the 
word. 
3.  Race, Neurorhetoric, the Right to Bear Arms, and Police 
Violence Against Black Men 
In a law enforcement context, racialized neural pathways of fear can 
ignite a rapid and unconscious bodily response, explaining why black men 
and black boys continue to be shot and killed by the police, such as in the 
cases of Trayvon Martin, Tamir Rice, Freddie Gray, and Mike Brown.126  
The possession of a firearm deepens these pathways of fear.  Both Alton 
Sterling, shot by police in Baton Rouge, and Philando Castile, shot the next 
day by police in Minneapolis, were reportedly armed with a gun.127  The 
twelve-year-old Tamir Rice, shot by police in the summer of 2015, was 
                                                          
 124.  See CONNOLLY, supra note 29, at 150 (“‘Aliens’ . . . are also coded as strange beings 
whose presence is threatening to ‘natives’ or, in this case, real citizens.”). 
 125.  See Flores, supra note 119, at 377–79, 381. 
 126.  See Chris Mooney, The Science of Why Cops Shoot Young Black Men, MOTHER JONES 
(Dec. 1, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/11/science-of-racism-
prejudice.  
 127.  Jesse J. Holland, Black Gun Owners Worried About Treatment After Shooting, A.P. (July 
8, 2016, 8:34 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/8e2c1e4bdb0f4de6bed23748b84d5c0f/black-gun-
owners-worried-about-treatment-after-shooting. 
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playing with a realistic-looking replica gun.128  In 1999, when New York 
City police officers fired forty-one fatal shots at unarmed Haitian immigrant 
Amadou Diallo, the initial shots were fired when one officer yelled “He’s 
got a gun!”129  There was no gun—what the officer thought was a gun was 
the edge of Diallo’s wallet.130  In the brains of these police officers, deep-
seated neural pathways light up when confronted with an image of an armed 
black man, or a child, in the case of Tamir Rice.131  These neural networks 
then unconsciously propel rapid action that often ends in tragedy.132 
Circling back to the concept that the law can become imprinted in the 
collective brain, statutory133 and common law narratives134 may have played 
a role in cementing the deadly stereotype of fear that has attached to black 
men in possession of firearms.  Prior to the Civil War, the right to bear arms 
was heavily restricted for black persons, including explicit bans on gun 
ownership, but these limitations did not apply to whites.135  After the Civil 
War and the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, new gun laws were 
promulgated that were neutral in their wording, but unequally applied to 
heavily regulate the right of blacks to bear arms.136  These laws were driven 
                                                          
 128.  Kellan Howell, Tamir Rice’s Toy Gun ‘Functionally Identical’ to Real Weapon: Prosecu-
tor, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/dec/29/tamir-
rices-toy-gun-functionally-identical-to-real/.  
 129.  Lucille A. Jewel, Through a Glass Darkly: Using Brain Science and Visual Rhetoric to 
Gain a Professional Perspective on Visual Advocacy, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 237, 256 (2010) 
(citing MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK 192 (2005)). 
 130.  Id.  
 131.  Elahe Izadi & Peter Holley, Video Shows Cleveland Officer Shooting 12-Year-Old Tamir 
Rice Within Seconds, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2014/11/26/officials-release-video-names-in-fatal-police-shooting-of-12-year-old-
cleveland-boy/?utm_term=.902273811dc8. 
 132.  See Jewel, supra note 129, at 256 (explaining that the killing of Amadou Diallo can be 
understood as the result of a rapid decision fueled by implicit bias).   
 133.  The language within statutes can be understood as narrative in nature and can influence 
the citizenry as well as judges.  See Elizabeth B. Megale, Disaster Unaverted: Reconciling the 
Desire for a Safe and Secure State with the Grim Realities of Stand Your Ground, 37 AM. J. TRIAL 
ADVOC. 255, 264–65 (2013). 
 134.  For an explanation of how judicial opinions function as narratives, see ANTHONY G. 
AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW (2000).  
 135.  See Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, “Never Intended to be Applied to the 
White Population”: Firearms Regulation and Racial Disparity—The Redeemed South’s Legacy to 
a National Jurisprudence?, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1307, 1320–33 (1995) [hereinafter Cottrol & 
Diamond, Never Intended] (describing the various racialized restrictions imposed on gun use and 
gun possession that existed prior to and after the Civil War); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Di-
amond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 
331–38 (1991) [hereinafter Cottrol & Diamond, The Second Amendment] (same); Clayton E. 
Cramer, The Racist Roots of Gun Control, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17, 18 (1995) (same). 
 136.  See Cottrol & Diamond, The Second Amendment, supra note 135, at 354–55; Cottrol & 
Diamond, Never Intended, supra note 135, at 1325–26, 1330. 
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by the belief that “‘they’ (i.e., blacks) were too violent and too untrustwor-
thy to be allowed weapons.”137 
The link between ethnic and racialized fear and gun possession contin-
ued into the twentieth century.  Some have argued that New York’s 1911 
Sullivan Law, which prohibited the concealed carrying of weapons and re-
quired a permit to purchase or own a weapon, was fueled by fear of guns in 
the hands of immigrants from Southern or Eastern Europe.138  California’s 
1967 adoption of a new arms control law has been explained as a frightened 
reaction to the appearance of Black Panthers in the California assembly 
chamber carrying “pistols, rifles, [and] at least one sawed-off shotgun.”139  
In the 1990s, gun control advocates argued that new restrictions were need-
ed to prevent assault rifles from being wielded by gang members.140  How-
ever, in the discourse about these laws, it was clear that hunting rifles would 
not be banned.141  The rhetoric posed the question of whether modern gun 
control laws were, at least implicitly, aimed to limit black ownership and 
possession of guns, but not affect the rights of whites.142 
A recursive and causal relationship can be discerned between the law 
and deeply embedded narratives about black gun ownership.  We can look 
at this issue from Professor Murray’s framework, discussed above, which 
holds that collective violence aimed at a minority group becomes acceptable 
through (1) rhetoric, (2) discriminatory laws, and (3) enacted violence.143  
In the context of blacks bearing arms, all three of these elements are pre-
sent. 
First, prior to and after slavery, black men have been rhetorically 
framed as monstrous, uncontrollable threats to social order and public safe-
ty.144  Second, the gun control laws, discussed above, further deepened the 
collective narrative of fear linked to black gun possession and ownership.  
The fear-based narrative appears in the language of the statutes as well as in 
the common law court opinions interpreting them.  For instance, in one 
Florida case, in which the court declined to broadly interpret a gun re-
                                                          
 137.  Cramer, supra note 135, at 22. 
 138.  See Cottrol & Diamond, Never Intended, supra note 135, at 1334. 
 139.  Cramer, supra note 135, at 21 (quoting Capitol Is Invaded, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 2, 
1967, at A1, A10). 
 140.  Id. at 22–23. 
 141.  Id. at 22. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text.  
 144.  See Tricia Rose, “Fear of a Black Planet”: Rap Music and Black Cultural Politics in the 
1990s, 60 J. NEGRO EDUC. 276, 279 (1991) (explaining that African American youth are often 
framed as “a dangerous internal element in urban America”); Sciullo, supra note 111, at 206–12 
(explaining that the “black danger” cultural narrative can be traced back to white slave-owners’ 
fears of a revolt as well as the construction of black men as uncontrollable sexual predators). 
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striction, the concurring judge specifically identified the racist purpose be-
hind the neutrally expressed law: 
 I know something of the history of this legislation.  The original 
Act of 1893 was passed when there was a great influx of negro 
laborers in this State drawn here for the purpose of working in 
turpentine and lumber camps.  The same condition existed when 
the Act was amended in 1901 and the Act was passed for the pur-
pose of disarming the negro laborers and to thereby reduce the 
unlawful homicides that were prevalent in turpentine and saw-
mill camps and to give the white citizens in sparsely settled areas 
a better feeling of security.  The statute was never intended to be 
applied to the white population and in practice has never been so 
applied.  We have no statistics available, but it is a safe guess to 
assume that more than 80% of the white men living in the rural 
sections of Florida have violated this statute.  It is also a safe 
guess to say that not more than 5% of the men in Florida who 
own pistols and repeating rifles have ever applied to the Board of 
County Commissioners for a permit to have the same in their pos-
session and there has never been, within my knowledge, any ef-
fort to enforce the provisions of this statute as to white people, 
because it has been generally conceded to be in contravention of 
the Constitution and non-enforceable if contested.145 
The metaphor of an invasion (“great influx”) serves to heighten the 
fear stemming from the black laborers entering the state.  And, the legal 
language on the statute’s intent reinforces the dichotomy between white gun 
ownership (deemed appropriate) and black gun ownership (considered in-
appropriate and dangerous).  A neurorhetoric approach holds that because 
of law’s iterative and repetitive nature—it is researched, cited, and ap-
plied—the language functions as a rhetorical stimulus that impacts the 
brains of all the legal actors that come into contact with it.  As explained 
above, the law has a special power to reify cultural beliefs and attitudes.146  
Thus, this rhetoric deepens those neural pathways that link black men with 
guns with an embodied and reactive fear. 
Third and finally, the laws restricting blacks’ access to guns left the 
black population completely vulnerable to private acts of enacted vio-
lence,147 such as terrorism from the Ku Klux Klan.148  Now, the violence 
                                                          
 145.  Watson v. Stone, 4 So. 2d 700, 703 (Fla. 1941) (Buford, J., concurring) (emphasis add-
ed).  
 146.  See supra Part III.B. 
 147.  As set forth above, enacted violence refers to the public performance of violent acts of 
physical aggression.  See supra note 75. 
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has morphed into state-sanctioned violence—the repeated killings of mostly 
young black men at the hands of a heavily militarized police.  With respect 
to the last step in Professor Murray’s explanation for how rhetoric morphs 
into mass violence, these public acts of enacted violence completely dehu-
manize the targeted group.149 
The end result is that there are two very different cultural images of 
gun possession—white gun ownership, connected to the land, and black 
gun ownership, connected to fear and crime.  For instance, in July 2016, af-
ter the Sterling and Castile shootings, lone gunman Micah Johnson opened 
fire and killed five Dallas police officers.  Very rapidly on social media, the 
police mistakenly identified Mark Hughes, a black protester, as a suspect.150  
Hughes was carrying a large assault weapon, which was completely legal 
pursuant to Texas’s liberal open carry laws.  The misidentification high-
lights that, in reality, there are two very different conceptions of gun pos-
session.  The rapidly circulated photograph of Hughes was a snap judg-
ment—perhaps unavoidable when there is grave danger to the public—but 
this snap judgment was based in part on an essential stereotype of a danger-
ous black man with an assault rifle.  And this stereotype is traceable back, 
at least in part, to the racialized gun laws themselves. 
To summarize, neurorhetoric explains that fatal police violence against 
black men is rooted, at least in part, in stereotypes that have become collec-
tively embedded in individual brains, stereotypes that link black men pos-
sessing guns with a propensity for uncontrollable violence.  This toxic nar-
rative begins with a fear of violence and ends with a collective acquiescence 
to state–sanctioned killing.  The manifold recordings of police shooting 
                                                          
 148.  See Cottrol & Diamond, The Second Amendment, supra note 135, at 342, 347–48.  There 
were some instances where blacks used firearms to defend themselves against the terroristic vio-
lence of the post-Reconstruction South, but these attempts were usually unsuccessful in the face of 
well-armed white mobs.  Id. at 353–54.  
 149.  See Murray, supra note 75, at 49 (explaining that the enacted violence against German 
Jewish people further cemented the collective understanding that Jewish people were subhuman).  
While the analogy between state violence and private violence against blacks in the United States 
and the experience of Jewish people residing in fascist Germany is not clean or neat, the threads of 
similarity might explain the unabated violence (from different directions) that continues to afflict 
black Americans.  However, unlike the command-and-control violence against Jewish persons, the 
violence experienced by blacks today is not connected to state agency; it is a more diffuse de-
ployment of force and power.  This diffusion of force aligns with theories that contemporary sys-
tems of social control are not linked to a top-down state actor; rather, control is carried out in a 
dispersed form, as a kind of apparatus.  See, e.g., VÄLIAHO, supra note 29, at 11–14 (citing 
GILLES DELEUZE & FÉLIX GUATTARI, MILLE PLATEAU CAPITALISME ET SCHIZOPHRÉNIE 2, 545–
60 (1980)); Michel Foucault, The Confessions of the Flesh, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED 
INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 194–228 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et al. trans., 
1980)). 
 150.  Kira Lerner, A Black Man Legally Carrying a Gun Was Wrongly Labeled a Suspect by 
Dallas Police, THINKPROGRESS (July 8, 2016), 
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2016/07/08/3796589/dallas-misidentified-suspect/.  
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black men function somewhat similarly to the messaging that vilified Jew-
ish Germans during the Holocaust, first through violent rhetoric and then 
through actual enacted violence.151  The images first reinforce fearful stere-
otypes, held mostly by whites, about armed black subjects and then depict 
enacted violence against them.  The narrative becomes cemented through 
relentless repeated exposure on the Internet, social media sites, and televi-
sion.  The enacted violence eventually becomes normalized.  The neural 
pathways of fear are deepened, initiating a mindless acquiescence to reac-
tive violence that operates to quell the fear.152  Finally, these toxic narra-
tives are recursively connected to the law, which has explicitly and implicit-
ly instantiated the fearful stereotypes about blacks in possession of firearms. 
While tragic instances of lethal gun violence continue to surface in the 
United States, this Essay does not engage with normative arguments either 
in favor or against further gun regulation.  Instead, it traces how neurorheto-
ric helps us understand the issue, and asks the question of what role, if any, 
did longstanding legal narratives play in entrenching these stereotypes.  We 
might be seeing what cognitive rhetoric scholar Elizabeth Berenguer has 
identified—a “culture-law-culture cycle whereby cultural narratives influ-
ence the creation of laws, which then impact the cultural narrative, cycling 
back to affect changes in the law.”153  Here, neurorhetoric contributes the 
additional point that the law and culture cycle operates through the brains 
and bodies of the audiences exposed to the narrative. 
The connections among gun violence, the right to bear arms, neu-
rorhetoric, and race represent a single thread of inquiry, chosen because it 
connects to terrible events currently foregrounded in the public conscious-
ness.  There is space, however, to explore other connections between the 
law and neurorhetoric, including: 
  Public education and traditional concepts of merit: did “separate 
but equal” become an entrenched neural pathway? 
  Social mobility: how has the law, which has operated to implic-
itly or explicitly condone redlining, race-based discrimination, 
and restrictive property covenants, embedded toxic stereotypes 
about minorities living in poverty? 
  Criminal justice: have racialized distinctions with statutory 
criminal law (for example, the vast differences in sentencing 
for crack cocaine versus powder cocaine) contributed to col-
lective consciousness concerning crime and black citizens? 
                                                          
 151.  See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text. 
 152.  See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text. 
 153.  Megale, supra note 133, at 257. 
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As far as solutions, a good first step would be to make law enforce-
ment officers cognizant of the toxic neural pathways that link blacks to fear-
based reactive violence.  For example, some police departments have initi-
ated training programs designed to make police officers aware of their pos-
sible implicit biases.154  Other police departments have accepted that implic-
it bias is unavoidable in policing and have promulgated new rules designed 
to dampen the impact of implicit bias, such as a rule prohibiting police of-
ficers engaged in a foot chase from touching the person being chased.155 
More importantly, to the extent American culture continues to liberally 
embrace firearms, celebratory narratives should promote positive images of 
blacks and guns.156  This thought is clearly out of step with typical progres-
sive arguments on gun control, which locate the proliferation of guns as the 
root problem.  However, instead of “guns don’t kill people, people do,” a 
more accurate motto might be to say that “guns don’t kill people, gun cul-
ture does.”  Moreover, culture is not something that people select like a pair 
of shoes; culture propagates itself and enters the collective mindset in a 
semi-autonomous way.157  American gun culture kills because it reinforces 
neural links between black gun possession and white fear.  Positive gun cul-
ture (which already attaches to white gun owners) proudly emphasizes pat-
riotism and self-sufficient security.  Efforts might be made to cohere posi-
tive aspects of American gun culture with black Americans. 
In this context, the largest challenge will be to alter pre-existing ma-
joritarian neural pathways, which currently deeply associate armed blacks 
with fear.  Longstanding “urban crime” narratives, based in part on true 
facts, have created a toxic neural loop that links images of armed black 
Americans with fear and anxiety.  Defusing this narrative would require 
whites to sit and listen, to be receptive of counter-narratives that challenge 
existing neural networks.  Young people will be important, as their brains 
have yet to be molded by these longstanding cultural tropes.  As fraught as 
the terms “white privilege” and “white supremacy” are, neurorhetoric may 
help bridge gaps because it places racial oppression outside the realm of in-
tentional performance.  Instead of intentionally racist behavior and thought 
                                                          
 154.  See Benedict Carey & Erica Goode, Police Try to Lower Racial Bias, but Under Pres-
sure, It Isn’t So Easy, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/12/science/bias-reduction-programs.html?_r=0; Tasha Tsiaper-
as, Top Dallas Cops Take Classes to Learn How to Fight Bias, DALL. NEWS (June 10, 2016), 
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/news/2016/06/10/top-dallas-cops-take-classes-to-learn-how-to-
fight-bias. 
 155.  Mooney, supra note 126. 
 156.  This is a suggestion rooted in pragmatism.  Given the unlikelihood that Americans will 
disengage from their attachment to guns and gun ownership, what can be done to shift existing 
narratives?  
 157.  See Lucille A. Jewel, Merit and Mobility: A Progressive View of Class, Culture, and the 
Law, 43 U. MEM. L. REV. 239, 251 (2012). 
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patterns, racism and racial oppression are often produced by signals travel-
ing on brain pathways operating below the conscious surface.158 
Alternative narratives might be created from historical details concern-
ing heroic black militias formed to resist white violence in the Jim Crow 
South159 or might popularize aesthetically compelling images of militant 
black resistance to violent oppression.160  Images of black persons with a 
gun should become images of pride, protection, and security, rather than 
images of fear.161  Of course, to the extent that Americans positively associ-
ate the use of guns for self-defense, perceptions of when guns are justified 
should change shape.  For instance, while the traditional story is that gun 
violence is acceptable for protecting the home, other narratives might justi-
fy guns as a protective prophylactic for criminally negligent police officers.  
In order for this alternative narrative to gain traction, however, mainstream 
white America must accept that black Americans experience encounters 
with the police in a way that drastically differs from the white experience.  
This has been one of the great rhetorical successes of the Black Lives Mat-
ter movement.  For instance, right-wing firebrand Glenn Beck has ex-
pressed that listening to the voices of the Black Lives Matter movement 
caused him to sincerely empathize with the pain and anger felt by black cit-
izens in current times.162 
                                                          
 158.  This is not to suggest that we ignore all aspects of individual agency in evaluating the 
production and reproduction of racism in the United States.   
 159.  See Cottrol & Diamond, The Second Amendment, supra note 135, at 354. 
 160.  See, e.g., Beyoncé References Black Panther Party at Super Bowl Halftime Show, FOX 
NEWS (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/entertainment/2016/02/08/beyonce-references-
black-panther-party-at-super-bowl-halftime-show.html.  
 161.  Steven Hildreth, Jr.’s viral Facebook post is one example of such a counter-narrative.  
Hildreth, a black man, described his experience of being stopped by the police while driving with 
his gun (concealed) in his lawful possession.  Even though he had traffic infractions on his record 
and was wearing a hoodie, the police still treated him with courtesy and respect, even compliment-
ing him on his Glock gun and how he had accessorized it.  In the post, Hildreth took aim at the 
Black Lives Matter movement, arguing that his experience runs counter to the idea that “the police 
are allegedly out to kill minorities.”  See Steven Hildreth, Jr., FACEBOOK (Oct. 27, 2015), 
https://www.facebook.com/stevenhildrethjr/photos/a.560555720661154.1073741826.2678338532
66677/1010278339022221/.  Hildreth’s post went viral and is often reposted in opposition to ar-
guments that the police routinely discriminate against and violate the civil rights of black citizens.  
Dan Evon, Terrific Stop, SNOPES.COM (July 8, 2016), http://www.snopes.com/steven-hildreth-
traffic-stop/.  Looking beyond its use by conservative social media commenters, this oft-repeated 
story strengthens neural pathways linking armed black men with valor and virtue and weakens the 
pathways associating armed black men with fear and violence.  It is, accordingly, an example of a 
counter-narrative that might help reshape the collective brain. 
 162.  Glenn Beck, Opinion, Glen Beck: Empathy for Black Lives Matter, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/07/opinion/glenn-beck-empathy-for-black-lives-
matter.html; see also Nicholas Schmidle, Glenn Beck Tries Out Decency, NEW YORKER (Nov. 14, 
2016), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/11/14/glenn-beck-tries-out-decency; David 
Weigel, Glenn Beck Urges Conservatives to Understand “Black Lives Matter”, WASH. POST 
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As this Essay has attempted to show, the creation of new neural path-
ways would require cultural intervention, media intervention, and an entire-
ly new lens for racial perception.  In essence, new powerful modes of dis-
course, ways of referring to black men and women, must be identified and 
reiterated, over and over again.  Difficult work must be done to erase exist-
ing neural pathways and form new pathways that would flow away from 
violence and toward peace and healing. 
IV.  CONCLUSION—A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO RHETORIC CAN 
UNCOVER HEALING ALTERNATIVES 
Neurorhetoric contains frightening implications.  Because individuals’ 
brains operate unconsciously, on a metaphorical level, and are physically 
affected by emotion, reason is often an ineffective strategy for persuasion.  
Moreover, the brain has been neurally marked by past rhetoric in a way that 
makes it difficult to change positions.163  Finally, it feels good to enter a 
state of mindlessness and receive rhetorical messages that emphasize com-
monly held precepts, even when those precepts are founded on biases and 
stereotypes.164  The more we understand about the way individuals respond 
to rhetoric to collectively produce oppressive outcomes, the more depress-
ing the landscape seems.  So, what can we do?  George Lakoff argues that 
advocates should develop compelling counter-narratives that work on an 
emotional, rather than logocentric, basis.165  Drew Westen theorizes that 
“[a] central aspect of the art of political persuasion is creating, solidifying, 
and activating networks that create primarily positive feelings toward your 
candidate or party and negative feelings toward the opposition.”166 
Rhetoric’s power to generate positivity is where neuroplasticity theory 
offers hope.  Despite its dark side, neuroplasticity posits that alternative dis-
courses, when they become widely dispersed in a culture, have the potential 
to reshape collective neural pathways.  If a harmful neural network is not 
continually reinforced, it can wither away.167  And, a wide river of toxic 
sludge can morph back into a trickling stream as new networks take over.168  
In this way, rhetoric can alter the structure of the brain and point it toward 
healing paths and away from harmful one.169  Thus, just as negative thought 
                                                          
(Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/08/15/glenn-beck-
urges-conservatives-to-understand-black-lives-matter/. 
 163.  LAKOFF, supra note 8, at 42. 
 164.  See supra notes 58–70 and accompanying text. 
 165.  See LAKOFF, supra note 8, at 60 (asserting that we should “[l]earn to argue powerfully 
and emotionally from the moral perspective of empathy and responsibility”).  
 166.  WESTEN, supra note 66, at 85. 
 167.  See Ingram, supra note 29, at 11. 
 168.  See id. 
 169.  Id. at 12, 44; LAKOFF, supra note 8, at 42. 
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structures can become entrenched in the brain (for example, the reward 
pathways prevalent in addicted brains), they can also be weakened, or even 
removed, with alternative discourses.  Talk psychotherapy is an example of 
a way to rewire alternative pathways because talking and thinking encour-
ages the brain to alter the strength of certain synaptic patterns that produce 
toxic thoughts and identify new, better pathways.170  Neurorhetoric allows 
us to imagine individual and collective therapeutic healing “strategically 
administered to trigger neurochemical reactions, which produce ‘affective 
dispositions that operate below the threshold of representation and intellec-
tual regulation alone.’”171 
In closing, and as a preview of future projects, this Essay proposes the 
founding of a new discipline—comparative legal rhetoric.  A comparative 
approach to legal rhetoric carries the potential to broaden our knowledge of 
rhetoric, improve practical legal advocacy, and uncover alternative dis-
courses that have the potential to heal.  Although the study of comparative 
rhetoric exists as a discipline, a comparative approach has not thus been ap-
plied to legal rhetoric.  There is value in looking to non-Western forms of 
rhetoric as guidance for reconstituting aspects of our legal system to make 
them less toxic and more healing.  Sources for inquiry, in developing a 
comparative approach to legal rhetoric, might include non-Western ap-
proaches to argument structure and problem solving.  Examples of these 
approaches can be located in the rhetoric produced by indigenous or op-
pressed groups, such as American tribal jurisprudence.  For instance, the 
peacemaking process incorporated into the Navajo legal system is one ex-
ample of legal rhetoric that heals rather than harms.172 
                                                          
 170.  DOIDGE, supra note 35, at 221; Ingram, supra note 29, at 44. 
 171.  Ingram, supra note 29, at 44 (quoting CONNOLLY, supra note 29, at 132). 
 172.  See James W. Zion, Navajo Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 18 TOURO L. REV. 563, 629–38 
(2002); James W. Zion, The Dynamics of Navajo Peacemaking, 14 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 58, 
58–60 (1998) [hereinafter Zion, Dynamics]; James W. Zion, The Navajo Peacemaker Court: Def-
erence to the Old and Accommodation to the New, 11 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 89, 89–90 (1983).  
Navajo peacemaking is a ceremonial mediation that emphasizes listening and giving voice to the 
perspectives of all individuals affected by the dispute.  See Zion, Dynamics, supra, at 66.  The 
process begins first with a prayer from the peacemaker, the naat’ aanii, which focuses the atti-
tudes of the participants and obtains buy-in for the process, a kind of priming that brings certain 
things to the surface.  Id. at 67.  Second, the participants in the process talk out the problem.  Id. at 
68.  Everyone with a stake in the hoxo (dispute) is given an opportunity to speak, from offenders, 
to victims, and family members.  Id. at 67–68.  In voicing his/her narrative, the offender names the 
monster, or nayee—“anything that gets in the way of a person living his life.”  Id. at 65 (citing 
Robert Yazzie & James W. Zion, ‘Slay the Monsters’: Peacemaker Court and Violence Control 
Plans for the Navajo Nation, in POPULAR JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY REGENERATION: PATHWAYS 
OF INDIGENOUS REFORM 67, 69 (Kayleen M. Hazlehurst ed. 1995)).  Other stakeholders in the 
controversy are then free to dispute the offender’s narrative.  Id. at 68–69.   
The third stage of the process is a form of teaching in which the peacemaker explains how 
similar disputes were resolved in the past.  Id. at 69.  Here, the offender is confronted with any 
inaccuracies inherent in his/her explanation for the offense.  Id.  The final stage of the process is 
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Comparative legal rhetoric should also take a broad approach and 
should not limit itself to comparing the rhetoric of formal legal systems.  
Legal comparatists, such as Pierre Legrand,173 Rodolfo Sacco,174 Roger Cot-
terrell,175 and H. Patrick Glenn,176 support the idea that comparative law 
and, by extension, comparative legal rhetoric might develop analyses of dif-
fering legal cultures and legal infrastructures—the things that undergird dif-
fering modes of legal consciousness.  An expansive comparative inquiry 
opens up explorations of alternative rhetoric such as African-American ap-
proaches to rhetoric and persuasion that may not necessarily exist within the 
                                                          
reconciliation, in which the consensus is reached as to what the remedy should be.  Id. at 69–70.  
Remedies might include reparation or restitution, and actions might be agreed upon to ensure that 
the offender does not repeat his/her past mistakes.  Id. at 70.  Actions might include agreements.  
In this part of the process, there could be a plan, a major Navajo justice concept that encompasses 
the process of “turning intuition reached through prayer and reflection into talk, and the ‘talking 
out’ of peacemaking into a concrete plan of action.”  Id.  The overall process does not require co-
ercive or punitive action.  Id.  Instead, it guides people toward an understanding that individual 
freedom should be exercised in the “context of the group and relationships with others.”  Id.  At 
the end of this healing process, hozho, a state of equilibrium and peace, should be achieved.  Id.   
Navajo peacemaking offers a healing alternative to traditional criminal justice systems that 
emphasize punitive and retributive approaches.  Instead of punishment and control, individuals are 
encouraged to talk it out and, in cooperation with the community, address the underlying problems 
responsible for the bad actions.  Id. at 58.  Further, the ceremony’s emphasis on speaking and lis-
tening, encouraging participants to voice their perspectives without legal limits (such as those im-
posed by the rules of evidence), functions as a kind of group talk therapy.  See id. at 66.  Talk 
therapy can change the brain for the better because the reiteration of good thoughts, through ver-
bal expression and listening, deepens positive neural pathways and weakens negative patterns.  
See DOIDGE, supra note 35, at 221.  In this way, Navajo peacemaking is an alternative legal pro-
cess that offers transformative healing for individuals and their brains.  
 173.  Legrand argues that the performance of comparative legal analysis requires engagement 
with the sociohistorical and sociocultural context and a recognition that law is not a discrete set of 
rules but “an indissoluble amalgam of historical, social, economic, political, cultural, and psycho-
logical data, a compound, a hybrid, a ‘monster’, an ‘outrageous and heterogeneous collag[e].’”  
Pierre Legrand, How to Compare Now, 16 LEGAL STUD. 232, 236 (1996) (quoting John Law, In-
troduction: Monsters, Machines and Sociotechnical Relations, in A SOCIOLOGY OF MONSTERS: 
ESSAYS ON POWER, TECHNOLOGY, AND DOMINATION 18 (John Law ed., 1991)). 
 174.  Sacco argues that legal comparatists focus on comparing legal formants, not just formal 
legal rules, but the below-the-surface rules and norms that actors actually follow and apply.  See 
Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 
1, 26–27 (1991). 
 175.  Cotterrell argues that a comparative approach to law should move beyond positive legal 
rules and engage with the cultural elements that inform legal reality.  Roger Cotterrell, Compara-
tive Law and Legal Culture, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 709, 710–11 
(Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006).  Within culture, Cotterrell includes “un-
derlying values or principles of a legal system, as well as traditions, shared beliefs, common ways 
of thinking, constellations of interests or patterns of allegiances of lawyers, lawmakers, and citi-
zens.”  Id. at 710. 
 176.  Glenn argues legal comparatists can use traditions as the subject matter for comparison, 
which would allow the comparatist to “step outside of the system, still remaining within (tradi-
tional) law, and require it to justify itself, to provide the means of com-paring and grounds for 
reconciliation.”  H. Patrick Glenn, Com-paring, in COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK 91, 103 
(Esin Örücü & David Nelken eds., 2007). 
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confines of formal legal advocacy.  For instance, critical race theory, alt-
hough it has not been incorporated into binding legal authority within the 
United States, still offers a competing take on the law that embraces con-
text, emphasizes narrative, and critiques existing legal categories that con-
tinue to harm the lives and wellbeing of communities of color.177  We might 
study the similar and dissimilar ways that speakers deploy irony in legal 
and quasi-legal proceedings.  As rhetoric professor Nick Sciullo suggests, 
there are hidden similarities between the caustic irony deployed by the for-
mer Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia and that deployed by hip-hop 
songwriter Wyclef Jean.178  There is space for instruction on Nommo, the 
ancient Egyptian rhetorical concept that “embodies the idea of incantation 
as transformation,” and the idea that the spoken word contains “life-giving 
power” over “life, death, disease, health, and . . . liberation.”179  Future 
comparative legal rhetoric projects might compare different modes of dis-
course with the goals of developing new knowledge, applying that 
knowledge to practical legal advocacy settings, and identifying strategies 
for carving healing paths in collective brain structures. 
However, in undertaking this endeavor, there is great potential to fet-
ishize or essentialize these “other” systems and improperly reduce other 
cultures to simple categories that function as foils to the Western system 
that is being compared.180  There is also a danger that traditional law might 
coopt these reasoning forms, which exist outside of the system, in order to 
promote goals that conflict with the aims of the original rhetors.  By way of 
example, one might think of how Eastern forms of thought have morphed 
into crassly commercial feel-good mantras and yoga poses.  Accordingly, 
we must remain vigilantly critical in developing comparative legal rhetoric 
as a discipline. 
                                                          
 177.  See generally RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN 
INTRODUCTION 3–14 (2d ed. 2012). 
 178.  Nick J. Sciullo, Conversations with the Law: Irony, Hyperbole, and Identity Politics or 
Sake Pase? Wyclef Jean, Shottas, and Haitian Jack: A Hip-Hop Creole Fusion of Rhetorical Re-
sistance to the Law, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 455, 480 (2009). 
 179.  Arthur L. Smith, Socio-Historical Perspectives of Black Oratory, 56 Q.J. SPEECH 264, 
264 (1970); see also Felicia R. Walker, An Afrocentric Rhetorical Analysis of Johnnie Cochran’s 
Closing Argument in the O.J. Simpson Trial, in UNDERSTANDING AFRICAN AMERICAN RHETORIC 
245, 248 (Ronald L. Jackson II & Elaine B. Richardson eds., 2003) (analyzing how Johnnie 
Cochran deployed Nommo rhetorical principles in his advocacy at the O.J. Simpson trial).  Arthur 
L. Smith is better known as Molefi Kete Asante, the prolific scholar and preeminent African 
American studies professor. 
 180.  Comparative rhetoricians have fleshed out this concern.  See generally Guo-Ming Chen, 
Moving Beyond the Dichotomy of Communication Studies: Boundary Wisdom as the Key, in DE-
WESTERNIZING COMMUNICATION RESEARCH: ALTERING QUESTIONS AND CHANGING 
FRAMEWORKS 157, 157–67 (Georgette Wang ed. 2011); Georgette Wang, Orientalism, Occiden-
talism and Communication Research, in DE-WESTERNIZING COMMUNICATION RESEARCH: 
ALTERING QUESTIONS AND CHANGING FRAMEWORKS, supra, at 58–64. 
